START I: A Retrospective by Polen, Stuart
IJOIS Spring 2017, Volume III 
Program in Arms Control & Domestic and International Security 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
START I: A Retrospective 
 
Stuart Polen 
 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 For decades, the United States (U.S.) and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) 
were competing to be the dominant global military power. However, after a series of crises, both 
states realized that if the status quo was maintained, it could mean the destruction of their states 
and the rest of the world. Thus, the U.S. and USSR agreed to limit their production of nuclear 
weapons. Eventually, the states decided that arms reduction would be the future and the resulting 
agreement would change the international power structure. The negotiations lasted for nine 
years, including a hiatus, and also led to another iteration of the treaty before the agreement was 
ratified. This study analyzes various aspects of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) 
negotiations, including the different stakeholders, their goals and tactics, alternatives, and the 
other factors that led to the final agreement. This study also analyzes the long-term effects of the 
treaty, its success, and who came out on top from START. 
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Introduction  
 During most of the Cold War, the U.S. and USSR engaged in a series of arms races to 
gain influence and hard power globally. Tensions from the arms races culminated with the 
Cuban Missile Crisis. Afterwards, the states began the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). 
These talks began so the states could reach an agreement on limiting the deployment of various 
nuclear weapons, including intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched 
ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) 
(U.S. Department of State). Although successful, later iterations of SALT were not as effective 
and the states eventually regressed to the status quo. This did not change until 1982, when 
Ronald Reagan suggested a reduction in arms instead of solely limitation (Reagan 1982). The 
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty was proposed to be a comprehensive and binding plan for both 
states, and it set out to reduce the arsenals of both powers (Reagan 1982). Although past 
frameworks were insufficient, the states had a mutual understanding that the status quo was 
unacceptable. START has improved since its 1992 ratification and it is still used as a framework 
for arms reduction today. 
 
Actors   
Actor A-The United States 
Due to the length of START talks, the negotiating team of the U.S. spanned across two 
presidents: Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush. During the Reagan Administration, the idea 
for START was first proposed during President Reagan’s address at Eureka College (Reagan 
1982). The agreement was coupled with a plan to modernize the United States’ arsenal by 
reducing strategic arms. As of 1982, the U.S. found itself on the wrong side of the balance of 
strategic power. The U.S. wanted to remedy the situation by reducing strategic weapon stores 
(The White House 1985). Strategic arms reduction was only one facet of Reagan’s foreign policy 
because he also wanted to improve America's standing abroad, especially in Latin American 
states (Rosenfeld 1986). In 1989, George H. W. Bush became president and continued the talks 
with the USSR. During his time as a negotiator, Bush worked to build confidence with summits 
and the U.S. Verification and Stability Initiative, which gave both parties experience in verifying 
and monitoring their arsenals (Federation of American Scientists). Much of Bush’s work on 
START I was based in finalizing the agreement, and he eventually signed the treaty in 1991 
(Federation of American Scientists). Throughout the negotiations, both administrations remained 
relatively cohesive within their negotiating teams.     
 
Actor B-The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) 
 Throughout the USSR’s involvement in the START I talks, the USSR, due to its 
authoritarian regime, followed a Monolithic Model and each negotiating team was relatively 
cohesive. That being said, over the course of the START negotiations, the USSR had a high 
turnover on heads of state. One of the leaders during the negotiations was Mikhail Gorbachev 
who worked with both U.S. presidents on START (Federation of American Scientists). Of the 
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Soviet premiers, Gorbachev was seen as the most cooperative during talks (Nye 1989). 
Gorbachev oversaw most the agreements on ICBM ceilings and other concrete limits, which 
were a point of contention throughout the negotiations (Bennett 1997).  
 However, after the signing of the treaty, the USSR went through a major change. The 
dissolution of the Soviet Union gave birth to four nuclear post-Soviet states: the Russian 
Federation, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Ukraine. This became a problem for the ratification 
process because the agreement was set up to be bilateral (Federation of American Scientists). To 
remedy the situation, the Lisbon Protocol was created so all of the post-Soviet states could sign 
on and begin the drawdown. Of all of the actors, the USSR was the most dynamic because of the 
series of leadership and regime changes.  
 
Actor C-The United States Congress 
 The U.S. Congress was responsible for the ratification of the START agreement. During 
negotiations, Congress ensured that the agreement would include concrete reductions in the 
quantity of ICBMs and other strategic arms to appeal to the electorate (Nye 1989).  It is also 
noteworthy that, much like the presidency, Congress experienced a change in leadership. 
Congressional leadership changed between the two major parties multiple times throughout the 
negotiation and ratification phases of START I (U.S. Senate).  
 
Conditions at the Onset of Negotiations 
 The negotiations and final product from START talks signaled a shift in Soviet-American 
relations and the negotiation paradigm that surrounded the arms control debate. At the time that 
Ronald Reagan proposed START in 1982, he asserted that there was “malaise and resentment [of 
the West]” within the USSR and that was due to failed agreements and talks in the past (Reagan 
1982). Before START was proposed, ripeness was the dominant paradigm due to the nature of 
the arms race that the United States and USSR were in. This is because arms races are very 
similar to the game of Chicken (Starkey 2010). Throughout the 1960s and up until 1982, 
agreements such as the resolution during the Cuban Missile Crisis and the SALT agreements 
came about because the status quo became absolutely unacceptable for both parties. In fact, the 
SALT agreements proved to be ineffective because of the rationality of the United States and 
USSR. SALT II was especially ineffective because of its “high ceilings and serious inequalities” 
(The White House 1982). Thus, it was not adopted and both parties reverted to the status quo. 
However, Reagan expressed his commitment to making a concrete agreement and building a 
more “constructive” relationship with the USSR (Reagan 1982). In his speech at Eureka College, 
Reagan marked the transition from relying on ripeness to focusing on readiness. This transition 
from solely resolving the Mutually Hurting Stalemate to focusing on an agreement that is 
mutually beneficial as well as long-term was a priority in Reagan’s initial START proposal. 
Nevertheless, START I marked the transition from just focusing on benefits and costs via 
ripeness to cooperation via Readiness.  
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Role of Public Opinion 
 During the first couple years of the Reagan Administration, public opinion was lulled into 
accepting the status quo, as the Administration’s official policy on arms control was that it was 
more of a problem than a solution (Nye 1989). However, this lull was short-lived, and Reagan 
eventually proposed START to appeal to the American public. Thus, throughout the drafting 
process for START, the public placed a high value on arms control. During the pre-Gorbachev 
era, arms control was a top priority for the American public because the USSR had a strategic 
advantage on many fronts (Nye 1989). This pressure compelled the Reagan Administration to 
maintain momentum during START talks, especially when the USSR abandoned talks in 1983. 
In order to get the USSR back to the negotiating table, Reagan signed the Intermediate-Range 
Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. This agreement removed the missiles from Western Europe 
(Federation of American Scientists). While the commitment to arms control was mostly 
consistent with the views/priorities of the American public, there were two challenges that public 
opinion posed. First and foremost, the United States had to properly communicate progress to the 
public. This led the United States to focus on communicating reductions of arms in terms of 
quantity as opposed to other proposed criteria. When it comes to arms control, the public places a 
high value on numbers because they are the easiest to understand as opposed to criteria such as 
missile range (Nye 1989). A reduction in the number of arms would translate to a safer world in 
the eyes of the average citizen, which was important since nuclear winter theory permeated the 
arms control dialogue (Robock 1989). The second challenge came about when Gorbachev 
ascended to power. Unlike his predecessors, Gorbachev was more committed to arms control and 
the public had more confidence in him (Nye 1989). This reduced the need for frequent public 
reassurance of progress and inadvertently led to slightly less pressure being put on the United 
States and USSR. However, these challenges did not impede negotiations and momentum was 
maintained. 
 
Issues at Stake   
 The negotiations surrounding START illustrated a very important issue for both the 
United States and USSR: the global balance of power was changing. As START negotiations 
progressed, analysts found that the diffusion of power became more and more apparent. 
According to Joseph Nye, this was due to a reduction of hard power on both sides throughout the 
talks, which resulted in more states becoming more politically active (Nye 1989). This gave way 
to the phenomenon of Polycentrism, which is a global power structure in which the United States 
and USSR are still hard power centers, but other states can establish themselves as political 
centers (Starkey 2005). As START became more of a reality, this power shift became more 
apparent. Thus, it would be beneficial for both actors to ensure that their exchange in hard power 
translated into a comparable gain in soft power. 
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Structure of Negotiations 
Summary of Structure (Bilateral, public/private, High Politics) 
 The structure of talks has a great effect on how negotiations are carried out. Factors such 
as the number of actors, whether or not the talks are public, and whether or not the actors 
perceive the issue as high-politics or low-politics can affect the proposal process. Typically, 
high-politics issues are typically addressed by the highest level of government. On the other 
hand, low-politics issues are much less urgent and can be addressed by more junior government 
members (Starkey 2005).  
 By virtue of its subject matter, the START I talks were bilateral in nature and were 
tended to by the highest government officials. Arms control was certainly considered a high-
politics issue by both actors, especially because nuclear arms were involved. While arms 
reduction was a highly salient issue for the U.S., it was not as serious for the USSR because the 
USSR had a strategic advantage over the United States in strategic arms, especially in terms of 
throw weight (The White House 1982). Finally, many of the talks and summits between the U.S. 
and USSR were known to the public. Minimal back-channeling occurred during negotiations and 
external observers were aware of the agenda and progress made (Bennett 1997).   
 
Opportunities and Problems of the Structure 
 The bilateral structure of the negotiations gave the actors a less complex forum in 
comparison to negotiations with three or more actors (Starkey 2010). Therefore, one can infer 
that the interests and intentions were much easier to communicate between the U.S. and USSR. 
One could assert that the public nature of the talks also fostered the development of Track II 
diplomacy, which typically leads to a more impartial analysis of alternatives (Starkey 2010). 
That being said, the secondary actors can lead to problems in team cohesion. While the 
negotiating teams could be cohesive at the highest level, they will also need to appeal to their 
domestic governments and allies, and those interests could cause internal conflicts. Such was the 
case when NATO deployed Pershing II missiles in Europe and angered the USSR to the point of 
walking away from negotiations in the process (The White House 1985).  
 
Influences: The Two-Level Game and Track II 
 During the START talks, both the two-level game and Track II diplomacy came heavily 
into play. In the case of the United States, all treaties must be ratified by both chambers of 
Congress. Without ratification by Congress, any agreement made would only be an executive 
agreement, and one can infer that an executive agreement would not be viable for lasting arms 
control. In order to make an agreement that could be ratified by Congress, the agreement had to 
appeal to the American electorate as well. This is due to the fact that each congressman wanted 
to retain his office (Morrow 1991). In order to make the agreement appeal to the U.S. electorate, 
the proposal must include provisions that the public could easily translate into progress (Nye 
1989). For example, the public is more likely to understand a reduction in the number of ICBMs, 
but perhaps not other limitation metrics, such as throw weight or the number of delivery 
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vehicles. This compelled the United States team to focus on arms reduction by quantity of the 
drawdown. Moreover, Congress could influence START by setting the defense budget. Congress 
had been known for making adjustments in the defense budget in order to bring the USSR to the 
table and show good faith, especially during the negotiations of SALT I and SALT II (Morrow 
1991). Thus, Congress had a significant role to play during the START talks. 
 In the case of the USSR, the two-level game did not come into play until the USSR’s 
dissolution. When the USSR dissolved, the Duma was established, and they were given the 
power to ratify treaties much like the United States Congress. One can infer that there was some 
concern that the newly-formed Russian Federation might not ratify START in its final form in 
1991, but it was passed with ease (Federation of American Scientists). While the Duma did not 
play a major role in the end of the negotiations, it is something that cannot be ignored. 
 Finally, due to the publicity surrounding the START negotiations, Track II diplomacy 
came into play during the final stages of negotiations. During negotiations, many drawdown 
strategies and criterion for the drawdowns were proposed, and many academics commissioned 
research to assess the viability of the different proposals. When talks began in 1982, the Arms 
Control Association commissioned research on many of the different initial proposals (Krepon 
1983). This report focused on reductions based on the SALT II framework, flat reductions, 
percentage cuts coupled with an arms freeze, reductions in operational forces (launchers and 
reentry vehicles), and reductions based on throw weight (Krepon 1983). The conclusion from 
this research is that many of the proposals at the time were not viable due to the extreme 
inequality between the arsenals of the United States and USSR. However, progress in Track II 
diplomacy mirrors the progress of talks between the actors, and in 1989, a new evaluation was 
conducted on the revised drawdown models. The analyses were conducted in conjunction with 
various analysis organizations within the U.S. Department of Defense and focused on various 
drawdown models involving warheads and delivery vehicles. Unlike the research from 1989, 
these analyses also explored the drawdowns from the perspective of the USSR more extensively. 
In fact, this analysis served as a framework for the final START agreement and led to the United 
States’ suggestion to follow a 2-2-2-1 drawdown limit (Owens Et. Al. 1995). As the negotiations 
progressed, these Track II actors had considerable influence on helping both parties find the most 
viable solutions. 
 
Additional Framing Concerns 
 START was initially proposed because the United States experienced a major change in 
policy between Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan. The United States was struggling against the 
USSR in their constant contest for global influence as demonstrated by the Soviet occupation of 
Afghanistan. Reagan wanted to regain the strategic advantage the U.S. had over the USSR, so he 
coupled his proposal for START with a modernized defense system and the establishment of the 
Reagan Doctrine. Between the USSR’s advantage in ICBM capabilities and its increased global 
involvement in areas like Afghanistan, Reagan’s chief policy goal was to level the playing field 
again. This resulted in an ambitious foreign policy that supported pro-capitalist in states such as 
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Nicaragua as well as leading the movement in arms reduction (Rosenfeld 1986). START was 
ultimately one component of an entire mission to restore U.S. supremacy over the USSR and the 
negotiations were complemented by missions abroad. 
 
Negotiation Proceedings 
 During negotiations, it is important for each actor to not only know their goals but also 
their limits. Throughout the proceedings, the actors have to guess the goals and limits of the 
other parties in order to come to an agreement. In diplomacy, this is characterized by green lines 
and red lines. An actor’s green line is defined as the main goal of the negotiations and represents 
the ideal outcome. In contrast, a red line is the very least an actor can accept from the 
negotiations. The concept of red lines and green lines is important to diplomacy because 
agreements come about due to an overlap between each actor’s red lines and green lines. This is 
known as the zone of agreement, or the set of agreements that are acceptable by both actors 
(Starkey 2010). It is important for an agreement to come from the zone of agreement or else the 
actors are forced to accept the next best alternative. This is known as the Best Alternative to a 
Negotiated Agreement, or BATNA.  
 
BATNA for the Actors 
 In order to understand the BATNAs for the United States and USSR, one must remember 
the nature of the diplomatic game the actors have been playing throughout the Cold War. As 
mentioned earlier, the status quo for the arms debate was an arms race. When analyzed in the 
realm of game theory, the arms race is like the game of Chicken (Starkey 2005). According to 
game theory, rational actors will continue the proliferation of arms until a breaking point without 
negotiation. As a result, if negotiations bear no fruit, then the game of Chicken will resume. 
Because of game theory, the BATNA for the United States and USSR is the status quo, which 
made drafting a reliable agreement that much more important. 
 
United States-Green Lines and Red Lines 
 The United States’ main goal with START was to enhance deterrence and increase 
stability of its nuclear arsenal. The chief green line of the U.S. was a “significant” reduction in 
ICBMs and other ballistic missiles, which the U.S. deemed to be the most destabilizing nuclear 
weapons. This was the most important green line for the U.S. since the USSR had a marked 
advantage in ballistic missile technology, plus Soviet missiles had better throw weights (The 
White House 1982). This green line also required an emphasis on the number of ICBMs, as the 
public would respond more favorably to a reduction in the quantity of arms as opposed to simply 
a reduction in throw weight (Nye 1989). Concerning ICBMs, other requirements in the green line 
included a ban on the testing, development, deployment of rapid reload capability for fixed 
missile launchers, and a limit on the number of stored ICBMs (The White House 1982).  
In terms of the red lines for the United States, the focus was on maintaining a comparable 
ICBM arsenal to that of the USSR and maintaining a general framework for strategic arms 
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reduction (The White House 1982, The White House 1983). First, the requirement of 
maintaining a sufficient ICBM arsenal served as a red line because, when coupled with the other 
arms reductions, the U.S. believed that maintaining some capacity in ICBMs was a 
“prerequisite” for its security (The White House 1982). The United States’ other red lines were 
outlined in the Basic Elements Paper, which was the broad framework used for its goals. Due to 
its broad nature and the fact that it served as the minimum for an agreement, the United States 
did not authorize the dissemination of the paper until at least the third phase of talks. This was to 
prevent the USSR from undermining the efforts of the U.S. by branding the goals as too broad, 
which could compromise the goal of establishing concrete limits on arms (The White House 
1983).   
 
USSR-Green Lines and Red Lines 
 For the USSR, START was quite problematic for its strategic advantage. As mentioned 
above, the USSR had superior ICBM capabilities compared to the United States (The White 
House 1982). Thus, the green line for the USSR was to reduce the inevitable losses of arms as 
much as possible. In order to do this, the USSR’s green line would involve arms limitations 
based on throw weight as opposed to a ceiling on the aggregate missile launchers and bombers. 
The USSR’s green line can be shown through a revised version of SALT II, as many of the 
provisions were more favorable to the USSR arsenal (Bennett 1997). This is because the 
proposed reductions by the U.S. would lead to the USSR having to dismantle ninety percent of 
its ICBMs in contrast to the fifty percent reduction on the end of the United States (Bennett 
1997). Through a reduction in throw weight, the USSR would be able to hold more of its ICBMs, 
which constitute a great deal of its leverage over the United States.  
The USSR’s red line is unique in that it does not necessarily directly involve arms 
reduction at all. Rather, the USSR’s red line was that the United States cannot deploy new 
missiles in Europe (Bennett 1997). This red line was violated by NATO when it deployed 
Pershing II missiles and cruise missiles in Europe (The White House 1985). This led to the 
USSR leaving the negotiating table for some time until the INF Treaty was enacted (Federation 
of American Scientists).    
 
Tactics Used 
 In diplomacy, each negotiation tactic can be grouped into either competitive or 
cooperative negotiation tactics. In terms of competitive tactics, the strategies are rooted in the 
notion that the particular negotiations occurring are a zero-sum gain. One of these strategies is 
positional bargaining, which is used when an actor proposes one position and refuses to move 
from it. Another is coercive diplomacy, which involves one actor compelling another to meet a 
specific demand with either the use of or the threat of force. Coercive diplomacy is closely 
related to the negotiating tactics of intimidation or Chicken, which can both involve a certain 
degree of force. In contrast, collaborative diplomacy occurs when both actors find common 
interests and frame the negotiations in such a way so that problem solving is the main focus 
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(Starkey 2010). One collaborative method of negotiation is interest-based bargaining, which is a 
tactic that involves the actor learning about the other’s needs and trying to find common ground. 
This tactic is closely related to both the listening strategy and confidence building. Another good 
collaborative tactic is cutting the cost of compliance, which builds confidence for the other party 
by reducing the risk of carrying out a given agreement (Starkey 2010). Actors can also focus on 
solving their problem by emphasizing a common vision, which can be useful for starting 
negotiations or building momentum. 
 Because of the United States’ poor experience with SALT II, the U.S. wanted to ensure 
that a concrete agreement on arms reduction that the USSR would not defect from was made. To 
achieve this end, the United States focused on communicating its intentions clearly and focusing 
on collaborative negotiation tactics. First, the United States focused on communicating the 
difference between slow-flying “clearly second-strike systems” and more destabilizing weapons 
such as ICBMs (The White House 1982). This tactic has some aspects of sequencing, because 
the proposed figures for reducing strategic arms on both sides were contentious for both the 
United States and USSR. By differentiating these two types of weapons, this could have made 
the USSR more amenable to reducing its arsenal. The United States also took advantage of Track 
II diplomacy by having the Department of Defense commission analyses on the drawdown 
possibilities for each state’s arsenal (Owens Et. Al. 1995). By not solely relying on the United 
States’ negotiating team, the U.S was using confidence-building measures and cutting the cost of 
compliance to further garner support from the USSR for their proposal. By analyzing the 
different drawdown methods and intermediate limits, the U.S. could find a drawdown that would 
give the USSR more flexibility, which would reduce the USSR’s risk and prevent defection 
(Owens Et. Al. 1995).  
However, not every tactic the U.S. used was collaborative. The United States was aware 
that, in order for congressmen to get reelected, the agreement had to have some concrete 
reductions in the number of arms to appeal to the electorate (Morrow 1991). Thus, the United 
States was able to get these reductions by making the USSR aware of its limited authority due to 
the two-level game. The United States also strategically lied by omission to protect its interests. 
This was mainly done during the early rounds of negotiations by withholding the Basic Elements 
Paper until at least the third round of negotiations. This was due to the fear that the USSR would 
undermine the United States’ efforts by saying that the proposal suggested by the U.S. was too 
broad (The White House 1983). To review, the United States put an emphasis on collaborative 
tactics to build the USSR’s confidence but was also able to leverage its limited authority when 
needed. 
 While the United States focused on collaborative tactics, the USSR put an emphasis on 
competitive tactics in order to prevent excessive losses from arms reduction. A great deal of the 
USSR’s tactics can be derived from positional bargaining and taking advantage of deadlines. For 
example, the USSR would use positional bargaining and misinformation by portraying their 
positions as final, which pressured the U.S. to make concessions. In this same strain, the USSR 
would demand concessions from the U.S. close to the end of their summits, which is known as 
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the “eleventh hour squeeze” (Bennett 1997). The USSR would also try to portray limited 
authority by stating that Soviet generals were not on board with the proposals made by the 
United States (Bennett 1997). However, the USSR also took advantage of external events to guilt 
the United States into concessions by intimidation. This was illustrated by the USSR walking 
away from negotiations after NATO’s deployment of Pershing II missiles in Europe (The White 
House 1985). The USSR did not return to negotiations until the conflict was resolved in the form 
of the INF Treaty, which mixed both intimidation and linkage (U.S. Department of State 2001). 
Due to the risks of losing major leverage over the U.S., the USSR had to focus on competitive 
tactics to ensure that the losses from arms reduction were minimal. 
 
Successful Tactics 
 As mentioned previously, a very large part of the United States’ proposals was the fact 
that reductions had to be focused on reductions in the quantity of arms so the electorate would 
approve of the treaty (Nye 1989). The United States was successful in achieving this end through 
keeping the two-level nature of talks in the foreground via limited authority. Another successful 
tactic the U.S. used was simply taking initiative. Based on my research, it seems that the U.S. 
was the first to make proposals throughout the talks (Federation of American Scientists). This 
seems to have paid off in more soft power in the long term, which is further explained in the 
section titled The Winners.  
 In terms of the USSR’s successful strategies, the state was the most successful in using 
linkage to their advantage. The USSR saw an opportunity with the NATO missiles in Europe to 
hold the START agreement hostage unless concessions were made, and it paid off by solving the 
issue of missile deployment in Europe for the Soviets (The White House 1985, U.S. Department 
of State).  
 
Effects of Time, Location, and Venue 
 During the START negotiations, both parties tried to set up venues and times that were 
impartial to either side. Many different rounds of talks occurred in Geneva, which is typically 
used for impartiality. Geneva was used as a meeting place throughout the START talks, and it 
was used for each side to present their draft agreements as well. The United States and the USSR 
also alternated hosting negotiating teams, as a few summits were held in Moscow and 
Washington D.C. between 1989 and 1991 (Federation of American Scientists).  
Moreover, timing was manipulated by the USSR to pressure the United States and NATO 
to reduce their aggression. At one point, NATO deployed Pershing II missiles in Europe to 
increase security, and this led to the USSR suspending talks. At the time, it seemed that violence 
would break out again between the United States and the USSR. However, instead of increasing 
pressure on the USSR, the action drove the USSR from the negotiating table and on the 
diplomatic offensive (The White House 1985). Fearing the loss of momentum, the United States 
worked with the USSR to create the INF Treaty, which brought the USSR back to the 
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negotiating table (Federation of American Scientists). In conclusion, the timing and venues were 
controlled to try and maintain neutrality so the START talks would not fall apart. 
 
Analysis of Outcome 
The Winners 
 When it comes to diplomacy and negotiations, the victors can be declared in many ways 
and, ultimately, winning depends on scale of reward and time. One way to judge an actor’s 
success immediately after a negotiation is through game theory. According to game theory, the 
winner of the game is the actor who comes out with the biggest gain in utility, as shown in the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma and Chicken models (Starkey 2010). In both models, the winner is 
determined by which actor can maximize their utility. That being said, this analysis can only 
judge a winner in the short term. Since diplomacy rarely happens in isolation and parties will 
often have to work with each other again, winners could be determined by who establishes the 
most goodwill to ensure that future iterations occurred (Olekalns & Smith 2007). In a similar 
strain, a winner can be determined by what kind of power benefits are gained from the 
agreement. More specifically, the prospect of soft power is a fair indicator of which actors are 
winners for an agreement. Many states use soft power as a metric of success because leading by 
example leads to more influence in both future iterations of negotiations with a given actor as 
well as the international community as a whole (Nye 1989).  
 As mentioned previously, START was an unprecedented agreement because it was the 
first of its kind to focus on arms reduction as opposed to simply limitation. Therefore, there were 
many benefits that were experienced by both the United States and USSR. START was an 
agreement that showed the commitment of both the U.S. and the USSR to addressing the issue of 
global arms proliferation. Thus, both states gained the favor of the international community to 
some degree because of the mutual nature. However, while both actors gained some favor from 
the international community, the United States would ultimately come out on top from START. 
This is because the short-term benefits that the USSR gained from START did not translate into 
substantial influence benefits in the future.  
 Before one can understand why the U.S. was the ultimate winner from the START 
agreement, one must understand the short-term victory that the USSR won from START. In the 
final version of START, the model used for drawdown limits was agreed to be a schedule with 
equal ceilings at the end of the third, fifth, and seventh years after the treaty’s ratification. The 
ceilings in the final version were based off the USSR’s straight-line drawdown as opposed to the 
one that the United States proposed. As a result, the USSR had more flexibility during the 
drawdown, especially in regard to multiple warhead ballistic missiles (Owens Et. Al. 1995). 
Because of the nature of this drawdown limit, the USSR was able to hang onto some warheads 
longer than the U.S. and thus maintain some hard power advantage during disarmament. Thus, in 
the short term, the USSR won through a more favorable deal. 
 Unfortunately for the USSR, the victory from the drawdown limits was short-lived and 
the U.S. came out on top. This is because the United States was able to gain more soft power 
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from START while being able to maintain other sources of hard power. First, while START 
reduced the amount of nuclear warheads and other missiles, the agreement did not address 
conventional weapons. This would prove to be important because after the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union, the United States stood uncontested as the global “military hegemon” (Starkey 
2010). This power structure, which began after the dissolution, is called Unipolarity because the 
U.S. military stands uncontested as a military power (Starkey 2010). Due to the dissolution, the 
Russian Federation’s hard power capacity is a shadow of what it once was. Moreover, the U.S. 
has been able to gain more soft power from START than the Russian Federation has. This is 
shown through the agreements that came about thanks to START, which include START II, 
START III, and New START. Regardless of whether or not any of the future agreements were 
ratified, one could assert that the United States gained influence because the U.S. was regarded 
as the initiator for all of these agreements. Moreover, due to the United States’ leadership on 
agreements such as START, one can assert that the U.S. had a smoother transition into a more 
soft power-dominated world. This is best shown by how the Russian Federation handles 
international crises. For example, in 2014, Russia annexed Crimea under the guise of protecting 
ethnic Russians in the region (Englund 2014). This scenario demonstrates Russia’s desire to 
dominate with hard power, and it shows that the state has not adjusted well to using soft power. 
This is not to say that the United States is a model for soft power necessarily because they are 
also known for exerting their hard power in scenarios, such as the war in Iraq. However, it could 
be argued that the United States is more accustomed to using collective action in other facets of 
diplomacy. All in all, the United States gained much more than what was shown on paper, and 
thus the USSR got the short end of the stick in the long-term.    
 
Critical Errors by Parties 
 Concerning the United States, the most critical error the state made was not being 
mindful of other sensitive security issues during the negotiations. As mentioned above, NATO 
deployed Pershing II missiles in Europe during negotiations, which angered the USSR into 
putting the talks on hold (The White House 1985). The United States should have been more 
aware of NATO’s deployments because by antagonizing the USSR, they almost put START in 
jeopardy. START could have met the same fate at SALT II due to this misstep. Had NATO not 
deployed the missiles, the United States might have been able to prevent the need to make 
concessions and come out with a stronger agreement in the end. However, the negotiations 
resumed after a brief hiatus. 
 The USSR also made the critical mistake of not thinking about the long-term implications 
of its actions. During arms control negotiations, the USSR was known to not take initiative. The 
USSR would make minimal counter-offers in response to the proposals that the U.S. made and 
simply react to the U.S. instead (Bennett 1997). This strategy was used to wear down the U.S. 
and goad them into making unilateral concessions. While this was effective during the 
negotiations, the lack of initiative led to the USSR not realizing the full benefits of soft power 
after ratification.  
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Major Accomplishments 
 When START I was first proposed by Ronald Reagan, it was a dramatic turn from the 
previous policy of solely arms limitation (Reagan 1982). In many ways, START I was a ground-
breaking treaty not only because it was the first of its kind, but also because of the foundation it 
established for long-term arms reduction. For example, the START talks also resulted in the INF 
Treaty, which was the first treaty that banned an entire class of weapons (U.S. Department of 
State 2001). Not only did the INF Treaty ban intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), but 
it also defined what an IRBM and what a ground-launched missile cruiser (GLCM) were (U.S. 
Department of State). This closed a semantic loophole which both parties would use and, in turn, 
made past arms agreements fail (Bennett 1997). Moreover, START I showed the genuine 
commitment of both the U.S. and the USSR to arms reduction. This commitment was shown 
during the dissolution of the USSR. In spite of the dissolution, the Russian Federation, 
Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Ukraine all signed on to START I via the Lisbon Protocol to reaffirm 
their commitment to the treaty (Federation of American Scientists). Between being the first 
treaty of its kind and the foundation for global arms reduction, START I was a major diplomatic 
feat.  
 
Effect on Reputation 
 For better or for worse, reputation has a strong effect on how negotiations are carried out. 
When it comes to reputation, actors can either use a distributive or integrative approach in their 
negotiations. In distributive negotiations, there is less chance for joint success than in integrative 
negotiations (Tinsley Et. Al. 2002). As a result, actors with reputations of valuing distributive 
negotiations are less likely to be trusted making it harder for that negotiator to get a future 
agreement. Moreover, there are many tempting opportunities to deceive the second party during 
negotiations. According to Olekalns and Smith, deception becomes more likely if goals in a dyad 
are not aligned. However, if there are common goals or multiple iterations of the same game, 
then deception decreases (Olekalns & Smith 2007). Therefore, in order for arms control 
agreements to succeed, the parties involved must be regarded as reputable and not deceive each 
other. 
 Despite the shortcomings involved in SALT and the early START talks, the United States 
and USSR were both able to finalize a treaty which was projected to reduce strategic weapons by 
35%. START also held the actors accountable for complying with the terms of the agreement 
(Nuclear Threat Initiative). START was one of the first arms control agreements that 
successfully curbed proliferation, and, as a result, the reputation of both the United States and 
USSR benefited considerably. The agreement proved that there was a concrete shift in Soviet-
American relations and that more cooperation could be expected in the future. But one of the 
most important aspects of START I’s reputation building power is that the agreement was upheld 
after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Shortly after the United States Senate ratified the treaty, 
the USSR broke up and four strategic weapon-holding states were formed: the Russian 
Federation, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. To accommodate the change, the Lisbon Protocol 
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was added so these states could become parties to the treaty, and it was signed and ratified by all 
parties (Federation of American Scientists). A testament to the success of START I is the fact 
that four states established trustworthy reputations in the realm of arms control as a result of the 
treaty. In short, all parties involved improved their reputation as fair and responsible negotiators. 
 
Likelihood of Recurrence  
 Due to its success, START I paved the way for three updated iterations of the agreement: 
START II, START III, and New START. Although START I would be in effect until 2009, the 
United States and the Russian Federation wanted to continue momentum and did so with varying 
degrees of success. Even while START I was being finalized in 1990, START II talks 
overlapped its predecessor. START II would eventually be ratified in 1996 by the U.S. and in 
2000 by the Russian Duma (Federation of American Scientists). After START II talks 
concluded, START III talks began. However, START III was made obsolete by the Strategic 
Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) in 2002, which set a cap on deployed strategic warheads to 
between 1,700 and 2,200 (Arms Control Association 2003). The most recent iteration of the 
START treaties is New START, which went into effect in 2011. New START streamlined the 
previous verification procedures to remove redundancies. Moreover, it did not impose limits on 
weapons testing of current U.S. missile programs (U.S. Department of State). Thus, the spirit of 
START has remained strong for over 20 years, and it has taught the United States and USSR the 
power of trust. 
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